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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
In this case we consider the assignment of liability for 
environmental cleanup under two federal statutes:  the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675; and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 
U.S.C. § 6901, et seq.  Trinity Industries, Inc. and Trinity 
Industries Railcar Corporation (together, “Trinity”) appeal the 
order of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, which granted summary judgment to 
defendant Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (“CB&I”) on 
Trinity’s CERCLA and RCRA claims and declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims 
raised by Trinity.  We consider the extent to which a 
settlement of state liability for environmental contamination 
affects the contribution scheme provided by CERCLA, and 
whether injunctive relief under RCRA is available when a 
remediation plan is already underway.  For the reasons 
articulated below, we will affirm in part and vacate and 






 The environmental contamination at issue in this case 
is located at an industrial facility called the South Plant, 
located on a fifty-three-acre property in Greenville, 
Pennsylvania.  Having acquired the South Plant in 1988, 
Trinity manufactured railcars there until 2000 but claims that 
no manufacturing activity takes place there now.  Some 
buildings in the South Plant are vacant, and some sections of 
the South Plant are used for storage.  In June 2004, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania started investigating 
allegations that hazardous substances were being released at 
the South Plant.  Pennsylvania initiated enforcement 
proceedings against Trinity in 2006, which resulted in 
Trinity’s entering into an agreement whereby it pleaded nolo 
contendere to five misdemeanor counts of unlawful conduct.  
Furthermore, on December 21, 2006, Trinity and the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
(“PaDEP” or “DEP”) entered into a consent order (“Consent 
Order”) whereby Trinity agreed to fund and conduct 
“Response Actions” according to a schedule approved by 
DEP.  The Consent Order was entered into pursuant to 
Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (“HSCA”), 35 
Pa. Stat. § 6020.101, et seq., and Land Recycling and 
Environmental Remediation Standards Act (“LRA”), 35 Pa. 
Stat. § 6026.101, et seq.   See Appendix (“App.”) 36-62.  
Trinity claims to have undertaken “preliminary investigative 
work in anticipation of cleanup,” but “has yet to perform 
shovel-in-the-ground remediation.”  Trinity Br. 55.   
 
 The Consent Order names Trinity as a “responsible 
person” for the release of hazardous substances at the South 
Plant but, Trinity claims, also “expressly reserve[s] [Trinity’s] 
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right to pursue its cost recovery, contribution, and other 
claims against CB&I.”  Trinity Br. 13.  Specifically, the 
Consent Order indicates that nothing contained therein “shall 
constitute or be construed as a release or covenant not to sue” 
parties not named in the Consent Order; moreover, “Trinity 
expressly reserve[s] the right to sue or continue to sue, or 
seek any other appropriate relief from” any party not named 
in the Consent Order.  App. 60. 
 
 Trinity’s claims are based on CB&I’s alleged role in 
causing the contamination now under remediation at the 
South Plant.  Trinity purchased the South Plant from MBM 
Realty Associates (“MBM”) in 1988, which had purchased it 
from defendant CB&I in 1985.
1
  In 1910,  CB&I constructed 
a facility for the manufacture of steel products such as storage 
tanks, pressure vessels, water towers, and bridge components, 
which it operated throughout its seventy-five-year ownership 
of the South Plant.  Trinity alleges that CB&I contaminated 
several identified sections of the South Plant through abrasive 
blasting, “pickling” (which involves submerging steel plates 
in acid), and painting.  Trinity points to deposition testimony 
from a former CB&I employee, Ken Montesano, who (like 
other deponents) confirmed that CB&I’s activities left 
residual materials on the site.  App. 224-34.  Trinity alleges 
that this residue is responsible for some of the environmental 
contamination at the South Plant.   
                                              
1
 The sale of the South Plant to MBM came with an 
Indemnification Agreement that indemnified the buyer from 
environmental harms caused by CB&I.  That Agreement was 




After signing the Consent Order with Pennsylvania 
that bound it to undertake remediation of the South Plant, 
Trinity filed the instant lawsuit under CERCLA, RCRA, and 
state law, seeking contribution from CB&I for its share of 
remediation costs and injunctive relief ordering CB&I’s 
participation in the remediation.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment to CB&I on the CERCLA and RCRA 
claims and, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, 
dismissed the remaining state-law claims without prejudice as 
to the assertion of the state-law claims in state court.  Trinity 
appealed the grant of summary judgment.  The United States 
filed an amicus brief in support of Trinity.  Greenlease 
Holding Company, the defendant in a similar 
CERCLA/RCRA suit filed by Trinity in the Western District 
of Pennsylvania concerning cleanup of a plot of land called 





 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as several of Trinity’s claims 
arise under United States statutes, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367, because the court could choose to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Trinity’s state-law claims.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 This Court exercises plenary review over a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same 
standard employed by the district court.  Curley v. Klem, 298 
F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002).  That is, we “grant summary 
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
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as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In doing so, “we 
view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.”  Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton Inc., 620 F.3d 392, 
395 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
 A district court can decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction in several circumstances, including a situation 
where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which 
it has original jurisdiction,” as in this case.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(3).  We review a district court’s decision not to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s state-law 
claims for abuse of discretion.  Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 




We consider whether CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B) 
provides a contribution claim where the party seeking 
contribution has settled its state-law liability (as opposed to 
its liability under CERCLA), and whether injunctive relief 
pursuant to RCRA § 7002 (a)(1)(B) is available where a 
remediation plan has already been instituted and begun — 
both issues of first impression before this Court.  Trinity also 
raised the issue of whether the District Court abused its 
discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over Trinity’s state-law claims once it had granted summary 




Trinity seeks relief against CB&I pursuant to 






] who has resolved its 
liability to the United States or a 
State for some or all of a response 
action or for some or all of the 
costs of such action in an 
administrative or judicially 
approved settlement may seek 
contribution from any person who 
is not party to a settlement 
referred to in paragraph (2) [that 
is, an administrative or judicially 
approved settlement of that 
party’s liability to the United 
States or a State]. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B).  Trinity argues that the Consent 
Order constitutes a resolution of liability as provided for in 
§ 113(f)(3)(B) so that Trinity is entitled to seek contribution 
from a party like CB&I.  The District Court, however, held 
that § 113(f) is inapplicable to Trinity’s case “because the 
Consent Order does not resolve Trinity’s CERCLA liability.”  
App. 18 (emphasis added).  Indeed, this case concerned a 
Consent Order pursuant to two Pennsylvania statutes, the 
HSCA and LRA — not the federal CERCLA regime.   
 
The District Court interpreted CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B) 
as allowing contribution only for claims brought under 
CERCLA itself.  As CB&I notes, this interpretation appears 
                                              
2
 Under CERCLA, “person” includes, among other things, 
“an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, 




to accord with that of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, which has determined that § 113(f)(3)(B) claims 
“create a contribution right only when liability for CERCLA 
claims, rather than some broader category of legal claims, is 
resolved.”  Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., 
Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2005).  Observing that 
§ 113(f)(3)(B) requires “resolution of liability for ‘response 
action[s],’” the court in Consolidated Edison concluded that 
“response action” “is a CERCLA-specific term describing an 
action to clean up a site or minimize the release of 
contaminants in the future.”  Id. at 95-96.   
 
The Consolidated Edison court relied upon a House 
Committee Report concerning the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (which enacted CERCLA 
§ 113) and noted that, according to this legislative history, 
“section 113 ‘clarifies and confirms the right of a person held 
jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek 
contribution from other potentially liable parties.’”  Id. at 96 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-253(I), at 79 (1985)).  However, as 
the United States points out, “this passage refers to 
contribution claims under § 113(f)(1), not § 113(f)(3)(B), as it 
is only through a ‘civil action under . . . section 9607(a),’ 
[CERCLA § 113(f)(1)], that a PRP [(“potentially responsible 
party”)] may be ‘held jointly and severally liable’ for 
response costs under CERCLA.”  U.S. Br. 19.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, read the legislative 
history’s “under CERCLA” requirement to apply to 
§ 113(f)(3)(B).  Accordingly, it held that contribution actions 
cannot be brought under § 113(f)(3)(B) when the settlement 
in question resolves liability for a state-law claim, as opposed 
to a CERCLA claim. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reiterated 
this rule in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos International, Inc., 
holding that agreement to a consent order that resolved a 
plaintiff’s New York state-law claims did not authorize the 
plaintiff’s suit under § 113(f)(B)(3) because the consent order 
“did not resolve CERCLA claims that could be brought by 
the federal government.”  559 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2009).  
That is, an “open . . . possibility” remained “that the [New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation 
(“DEC”)] or EPA could, at some future point, assert 
CERCLA or other claims,” id., so the resolution of liability 
necessary for a § 113(f)(3)(B) claim did not exist.  Likewise, 
many of the district court cases cited by CB&I as further 
support for this rule largely rely upon the rule promulgated in 
Consolidated Edison and followed in W.R. Grace.  See, e.g., 
Differential Dev.-1994, Ltd. v. Harkrider Distrib. Co., 470 F. 
Supp. 2d 727, 740-43 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (citing Consolidated 
Edison for the proposition that a settlement that does not 
expressly resolve CERCLA liability does not authorize a 
CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action); City of 
Waukesha v. Viacom Int’l Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1115 
(E.D. Wis. 2005) (same). 
 
 Notwithstanding the rule adopted by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit and by various district courts, 
we hold that § 113(f)(3)(B) does not require resolution of 
CERCLA liability in particular.  The statutory language of 
§ 113(f)(3)(B) requires only the existence of a settlement 
resolving liability to the United States or a state “for some or 
all of a response action.”  Section 113(f)(3)(B) does not state 
that the “response action” in question must have been 
initiated pursuant to CERCLA — a requirement that might 
easily have been written into the provision.  Furthermore, as 
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explained above, the legislative history that the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit relied upon in reading the 
CERCLA-specific requirement into § 113(f)(3)(B) actually 
concerns the enactment of a different provision — 
§ 113(f)(1).   
 
 We therefore agree with Trinity and the United States 
that § 113(f)(3)(B) does not require that a party have settled 
its liability under CERCLA in particular to be eligible for 
contribution.  To begin with, we are persuaded by the lack of 
any indication to the contrary in the plain language of the 
statute itself.  In addition, our case law in a related context 
compels this result.  In United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 
we considered whether 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (CERCLA 
§ 107(a)), a CERCLA provision allowing the United States 
and others to recover the costs of overseeing waste removal, 
applies even when the waste removal is not undertaken 
pursuant to CERCLA.  2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled 
on other grounds by United States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours 
& Co., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005).  There, we located “no 
support in the text or legislative history of CERCLA for the 
suggestion that identical oversight activity on the part of the 
government should be considered a removal if the 
government invokes CERCLA, but not a removal if other 
statutory authority is invoked.”  Id. at 1275.    
 
In Rohm & Haas, we reasoned that this conclusion was 
particularly appropriate “given the similarity of the provisions 
of RCRA and CERCLA authorizing EPA to order private 
parties to conduct corrective activity.”  Id.  That is, we held 
that the absence of a CERCLA-specific requirement in the 
text of § 107(a) was particularly noteworthy given the 
similarity between the remediation provisions of RCRA (the 
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scheme under which the waste cleanup at issue in Rohm & 
Haas was performed) and those of CERCLA.  Such similarity 
is also found in the instant case, where the Pennsylvania 
statutes explicitly referred to in the Consent Order — the 
HSCA and LRA — bear a strong resemblance to CERCLA, 
and even make reference to CERCLA.  This Court has 
observed, “[the defendant’s] liability [under CERCLA] is 
neither greater nor lesser under the HSCA. . . .  Indeed, the 
cost recovery and contribution provisions in HSCA are 
virtually identical to those in CERCLA.”  Agere Sys., Inc. v. 
Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 236 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quotation marks omitted).   
 
The Consent Order, moreover, is also authorized under 
§ 106(a) of Pennsylvania’s LRA, which provides that “the 
remediation standards established under this act shall be 
considered as applicable, relevant and appropriate 
requirements for this Commonwealth under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 . . . and the Hazardous Sites Cleanup 
Act.”  35 Pa. Stat. § 6026.106(a).  The LRA also provides that 
“[a]ny person demonstrating compliance with the 
environmental remediation standards established in Chapter 3 
shall be relieved of further liability for the remediation of the 
site under the statutes outlined in section 106 [35 Pa. Stat. 
§ 6026.106(a)],” which include CERCLA.  35 Pa. Stat. 
§ 6026.501(a).  Accordingly, under Pennsylvania law, 
remediation pursuant to the LRA is remediation under 
CERCLA.  Thus, the resolution of LRA claims necessarily 
means resolution of claims under CERCLA, alleviating the 
concern expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit of “leaving open the  possibility that the DEC or EPA 
13 
 
could, at some future point, assert CERCLA or other claims.”  
W.R. Grace, 559 F.3d at 91.
3
   
 
We note, finally, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit appears to have begun to retreat from its holding in 
Consolidated Edison and W.R. Grace that, for the purposes of 
CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B), a “response action” means a 
response action under CERCLA in particular.  In resolving a 
different CERCLA issue in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010),
4
 the Court 
                                              
3
 In this case the Consent Order contains a section entitled 
“Department’s Covenants Not to Sue,” which expressly states 
that “the Department[] covenants not to sue or to take 
administrative action against Trinity for Response Costs, 
Response Actions, and injunctive relief arising from the 
release or threatened release of hazardous substances at 
and/or potentially migrating from the North Plant and/or 
South Plant.”  App. 55.  This language is considerably 
broader than that found, for example, in W.R. Grace, where 
the court held that specific resolution of CERCLA claims is 
necessary for application of § 113(f)(3)(B).  Compare W.R. 
Grace, 559 F.3d at 91 (releasing party from liability “pursuant 
to Article 27, Title 13, of the [New York Environmental 
Conservation Law]”) with App. 55. 
 
4
 In Niagara Mohawk, the court considered whether or not a 
consent order under § 113(f)(3)(B) applied to an enforcement 
action when the New York DEC specified that CERCLA 
liability was resolved.  The specific issue in that case was 
whether the DEC had the authority to settle CERCLA claims 
at all, and the Niagara Mohawk court concluded that 
§ 113(f)(3)(B) applied, as “New York is empowered to settle 
14 
 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit stressed that “states play a 
critical role in effectuating the purposes of CERCLA,” id. at 
126, and that “CERCLA views the states as independent 
entities that do not require the EPA’s express authorization 
before they can act,” id. at 127.  Thus the Niagara Mohawk 
court underscored that CERCLA promotes state participation; 
indeed, § 113(f)(3)(B) itself applies to a party that has 
“resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some 
or all of a response action.”  CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B) 
(emphasis added).  The court cited the brief of the United 
States (also appearing as amicus curiae in Niagara Mohawk), 
which argued that “‘[t]he settlement of federal and state law 
claims other than those provided by CERCLA fits within 
§ 113(f)(3)(B) as long as the settlement involves a cleanup 
activity that qualifies as a ‘response action’ within the 
meaning of CERCLA § 101(25).’”  Id. at 126 n.15 (quoting 
Brief of United States).  Although the Niagara Mohawk Court 
was not called upon to address that question, which it referred 
to as “the Consolidated Edison/W.R. Grace problem,” it did 
acknowledge that “there is a great deal of force to this 
argument given the language of the statute.”  Id.  We agree, 
and therefore will vacate and remand the District Court’s 




                                                                                                     
a PRP’s CERCLA liability.”  Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d at 
127. 
5
 Trinity also raised on appeal the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to CB&I on Trinity’s CERCLA § 107(a) 
claim.  However, at oral argument counsel for Trinity 
identified the § 107(a) claim as an alternative argument, 
indicating that it would abandon that claim if this Court were 





Trinity also argues that the District Court erred in 
denying injunctive relief for its claim under RCRA.  Section 
7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA provides that  
 
any person may commence a civil action on his own 
behalf . . . against any person . . . including any past or 
present generator, past or present transporter, or past or 
present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or 
disposal facility, who has contributed or who is 
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).  Although the District Court found 
that “there are disputed issues of material fact regarding the 
existence of an imminent and substantial danger at the Site,” 
it nevertheless granted summary judgment to CB&I because 
it held there was “no meaningful relief available under RCRA 
in light of the Consent Order.”  App. 19-20. 
 
 This Court has held that to prevail under RCRA 
§ 7002(a)(1)(B), a plaintiff must prove:  (1) that the defendant 
is or was a “generator or transporter of solid or hazardous 
waste or one who was or is an owner or operator of a solid or 
hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility”; (2) 
that the defendant contributed to the “handling, storage, 
                                                                                                     
§ 113(f)(3)(B) claim.  Accordingly, we do not review the 
District Court’s order as to the dismissal of the claim brought 
pursuant to § 107(a). 
16 
 
treatment, transportation, or disposal of solid or hazardous 
waste”; and (3) that the waste “may present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to health or the environment.”  
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 
258 (3d Cir. 2005).  The District Court found that all three 
requirements of the Interfaith test were met.  Trinity naturally 
does not challenge the District Court’s findings, and CB&I 
does not either.    
  
Despite finding that Trinity had proven the necessary 
elements of a § 7002(a)(1)(B) claim, the District Court denied 
Trinity relief under RCRA because it held that the Consent 
Order rendered any injunctive relief futile.  App. 23.  
Specifically, the District Court held that, because the Consent 
Order required Trinity to remediate all contamination at the 
South Plant, “an injunction directing CBI to engage in the 
cleanup is not warranted.”  Id.   
 
As the District Court correctly observed, two types of 
injunctions are available under § 7002(a)(1)(B):  (1) a 
mandatory injunction that requires a responsible party to 
participate in cleanup and the proper disposal of waste; or (2) 
a prohibitory injunction restraining the party from further 
action violating RCRA.  Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 
479, 484 (1996).  The latter kind of injunction is, of course, 
unavailable in this case, since CB&I is no longer involved at 
the South Plant and thus cannot be prohibited from “further 
action” in violation of RCRA.  As for the former, a 
mandatory injunction is an extraordinary remedy that is only 
granted sparingly by the courts.  Communist Party of Ind. v. 
Whitcomb, 409 U.S. 1235, 1235 (1972) (noting that a 
mandatory injunction is an “extraordinary remedy [to] be 
employed only in the most unusual case.”); United States v. 
17 
 
Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175, 1181 (3d  Cir. 1976) 
(“The power to issue a preliminary injunction, especially a 
mandatory one, should be sparingly exercised.”).  We have 
noted that when mandatory injunctive relief is sought, “the 
burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.”  Punnett v. 
Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980).  Indeed, the moving 
party’s “right to relief must be indisputably clear.”  
Communist Party, 409 U.S. at 1235. 
 
The District Court determined that a mandatory 
injunction is unavailable to Trinity because the Consent Order 
already compels Trinity to institute remediation measures at 
the South Plant.  The District Court relied largely on 87th 
Street Owners Corp. v. Carnegie Hill 87th Street Corp., 251 
F. Supp. 2d 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  There, the court held that, 
even though the plaintiff had established genuine issues of 
material fact as to its RCRA claim, the fact that “the actions 
that allegedly created the danger are in the past,” and because 
“plaintiff has been unable to describe a single action that 
defendant could be ordered to take to reduce or eliminate any 
risk its past actions may have caused” that the state had not 
already undertaken, the court could not use its power to 
restrain in that context.  Id. at 1219.  That is, the 87th Street 
court appeared to hold, as the District Court in this case held, 
that a prohibitory injunction could not be ordered (since the 
defendant was not currently taking actions that could be 
prohibited or restrained), and that a mandatory injunction 
would require the court to exercise a broader power than 
RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) authorizes. 
 
Section 7002(a)(1)(B) permits a district court “to order 
[a person who may have contributed to endangerment] to take 
such . . . action as may be necessary.”  The District Court 
18 
 
reasoned that it would be impossible to deem a mandatory 
injunction “necessary” for § 7002(a)(1)(B) purposes in a case 
like this one, in which a remedial scheme is already 
underway.  See Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 650 
(3d Cir. 2003) (striking part of injunction that “was not 
necessary”).  We have not yet considered this issue in the 
RCRA context, although Trinity urges us to apply the 
ultimate holding of Interfaith, wherein we affirmed the grant 
of a RCRA injunction after the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) had previously taken 
steps to order remediation of a contaminated site.  However, 
as CB&I points out, we held in Interfaith that “a fair reading 
of the record casts strong doubt as to whether there is a [state-
agency ordered] process to override,” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 
267, since the district court had found that the defendant’s 
“dilatory tactics and NJDEP’s inability to deal effectively 
with those tactics” thwarted the remediation process and 
therefore did make an injunction “necessary” under the 
RCRA, id. at 267-68.   
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has cited the 
holding of 87th Street favorably, holding that where remedial 
“efforts have been ongoing, and absent a clear reason . . . to 
find them deficient, we see no error in the district court’s 
conclusion that it could grant no further relief to the plaintiff 
beyond what is already being done.”  Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 431 (5th 
Cir. 2013).  In Center for Biological Diversity, the court held 
that a plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief against a 
defendant where the Executive Branch was “charged with the 
responsibility to oversee the cleanup,” and where there was 
no reason to make a determination that that cleanup scheme 
was deficient or ineffective.  Id.  In Interfaith, by contrast, just 
19 
 
such a determination was made, as we considered the 
“substantial breakdown in the agency process” to be 
significant in our decision to affirm the district court’s order 
of injunctive relief.  Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 265.  In this case, 
Trinity has not contended that the remediation scheme put in 
place by the Consent Order is deficient or ineffective.   
 
The Supreme Court has distinguished the remedial 
scheme created by RCRA from the CERCLA scheme in the 
following manner:  “RCRA is not principally designed to 
effectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate 
those who have attended to the remediation of environmental 
hazards.”  Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 483.  “RCRA’s primary 
purpose, rather, is to reduce the generation of hazardous 
waste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and 
disposal of that waste” to “minimize the present and future 
threat to human health and the environment.”  Id. (quotation 
marks omitted).  Trinity has not shown that future 
participation by CB&I in the remediation effort will aid in the 
minimization of such threats.  That is, Trinity has not shown 
that CB&I’s participation is “necessary” as RCRA 
§ 7002(a)(1)(B) requires, now that the conditions of the 
Consent Order are in place and appear to be effective.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to CB&I as to Trinity’s request for an 




 Trinity seeks, finally, our review of the District 
Court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over Trinity’s state-law claims.  The District Court declined 
to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) 
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in the context of its granting summary judgment as to all of 
Trinity’s federal claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The 
district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has 
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”).  
Because our decision to remand this matter as to the 
CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B) claim means that not all claims over 
which the District Court has original jurisdiction are 
dismissed, we will also vacate and remand the District 
Court’s order as to supplemental jurisdiction, to give the 
District Court an opportunity to consider exercising its 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
vacate and remand in part. 
 
